University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2-25-2013

The Classical American State and the Regulation of Morals
Herbert J. Hovenkamp
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Law and Economics
Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal Theory Commons, Public Policy
Commons, Social Policy Commons, and the United States History Commons

Repository Citation
Hovenkamp, Herbert J., "The Classical American State and the Regulation of Morals" (2013). Faculty
Scholarship at Penn Law. 1906.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1906

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Hovenkamp
May, 2012

Classical Economy Regulation of Morals

Page 1

The Classical American State and the Regulation of Morals
Herbert Hovenkamp*
Introduction
"Welfare" was a word with a much richer, variegated, and less technical meaning
during the early nineteenth century than it would acquire in the Victorian Era and later.
Classical political economists and moral philosophers as well as American legal writers
emphasized the close link between economic wealth and good morals. One nineteenth
century vision of the society saw a tiny role for the state in the direct regulation of
economic well-being, but a large role in the regulation of morals. But good morals led to
increased welfare.
In fact the United States had a strong tradition of regulation at every
governmental level that stretched back to the commonwealth ideal of Revolutionary
times and grew steadily throughout the nineteenth century.1 At the same time,
regulation also had more than its share of critics. For example, a core principle of
Jacksonian democracy was that too much regulation was for the benefit of special
interests, mainly wealthier and propertied classes. Equal access entailed that the state
must be less involved in regulation of the economy and must also democratize its
existing institutions. For example, one of the great triumphs of the Jackson era was the
emergence of the democratic general business corporation that was available to almost
any group of entrepreneurs with capital, and that did not involve all of the special
privileges that had traditionally accompanied corporate status.2 But while the general
corporation greatly increased the volume of business carried on through corporations, it
*
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hardly stemmed the tide of ever increasing regulation. Nor did it quiet the stream of
nineteenth century American political economists who railed against it. 3
Prior to the Civil War state regulation raised federal issues only infrequently. All
powers not granted to the federal government were reserved to the states. The most
notable exceptions were state debtor relief legislation that was thought to violate the
contract clause or interfere with exclusive federal control over bankruptcy, or cases that
preserved the federal commerce power by limiting the rights of states to regulate
outside their territory or impede the flow of interstate commerce.4 The legacy of
Jacksonian democracy was largely to provide a view, sometimes dominant and
sometimes dissenting, that state courts should limit the scope of state or local
regulation that limited property or contract rights at the behest of some special interest.
No general case can be made that this view served to eliminate either the amount or
variety of regulation to any significant degree significant degree,5 but it did give voice to
a large number of critics and acquired considerable force in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Indeed, it does so to this day.
The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War provided the
lever that laissez faire legal writers began to use in the late nineteenth century to make
a more coherent federal case against increasing regulation.6 How much they actually
succeeded has always been subject to very considerable dispute. In fact, only a
relatively small portion of regulations were actually struck down by the courts on
substantive due process grounds.7 But looking at sheer numbers hardly tells the story.
3

Id. at 171-192.
E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (prohibiting state from creating monopoly
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same rouge); Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (permitting state
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4
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The provisions that were struck down went to the heart of emerging class conflicts,
particularly capitalist-employee relationships, including laws that established minimum
wages or regulated working conditions. In general, if the courts saw a regulation as
legitimately addressing a subject of “health, safety or morals” they let it stand.
However, if they viewed it as a subject of special interest rent seeking or as
representing a material attempt to alter the balance between social classes, they were
much more likely to strike it down.
By and large, substantive due process decisions almost always approved
traditional assertions of the regulatory power that were well established since the
Revolution and even earlier. They increasingly objected, however, to what they saw as
new forms of regulation that reflected the growing power of the labor movement or that
sought in other ways to readjust the power of economic classes. As a result, looking at
the sheer numbers of substantive due process challenges in which acts were sustained
disguises the basic question. Very significantly, substantive due process became a set
of limitations on the growing power of “class” legislation, and the labor movement in
particular.
The 180-Degree Turn
While the amount of regulation during the 1800s was significant, the basic
ideology of the attackers shifted 180 degrees over the course of the century. In the
1820s and 1830s the principal beneficiaries of regulation were thought to be the
established classes who stood to gain from regulation that protected their investment.
The loose affiliation of diverse outsider groups that constituted the Jacksonian
movement largely saw freedom from regulation as a device for opening up markets.8
Regulation of the traditional areas of health, safety and morals remained relatively
uncontroversial. Increasingly after the Gilded Age, War, however, the rhetoric of
regulation began to point at American business as the culprit in need of regulation, and
laborers and to a lesser extent consumers as regulation’s beneficiaries. As a result the
task of defending greater regulation fell to the Progressive coalition, while the more
propertied classes tended to oppose it.
From this political movement, classical legal thought either developed or reiterated
several principles of economic welfare that eventually came to be associated with
substantive due process or related constitutional doctrines. Among these were first, that
government had a substantive obligation not to interfere in economic markets. Monopoly
grants, licensing restrictions or other entry barriers, or regulations of the terms under which
Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV.
294 (1913).
8
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business could be conducted were all suspect. Second, taxation was appropriate only if it
was for a “public” purpose, which did not include the provision of subsidies or similar
incentives to private enterprise.9 Third, people should have equal access to markets and
economic opportunities, and many forms of government intervention benefitted favored
groups selectively, at the expense of politically unfavored groups. Fourth, the domain of
government regulation of the economy should be confined by restrictive readings of the
Constitution.
The terms "conservative" and "liberal" have historically identified two views about
the appropriate scope of government intervention into both markets and morals. Liberals
emphasized freedom from public restraint, and in the eighteenth or nineteenth century the
cry to get government off our backs would have come from someone denominated
"liberal," such as Englishman John Stuart Mill or American Thomas Jefferson. Mill's 1849
Political Economy was more strident than any of his classical predecessors including
Adam Smith that government should stay out of markets. This liberalism applied to both
economic regulation and regulation of morals, or religious conduct.10 The Jeffersonian
idea of separation of Church and state is a classic example of traditional liberal doctrine as
applied to morals: government must not interfere with people attempting to exercise their
religious beliefs and may assert no preferences among religions or even for religion over
non-religion. Liberalism tends to regard both property rights and liberty rights as more-orless equally sacred: for the State to regulate one's property without good reason is bad,
but to regulate one's right to associate or exercise one's religious beliefs without good
reason is at least as bad.
By contrast, conservatives wished to preserve a social order in which the state was
more heavily involved in the regulation of moral behavior.11 Historically, conservatives
also believed in state economic intervention. For example, the American Federalists were
conservatives in their views of moral authority, and continued to support an established
Church for some thirty years after the Constitution was ratified.12 But they also believed
9. E.g., Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 659-660 (1875) (striking down tax-financed
railroad subsidy as not for a "public purpose").
10. JOHN S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 589-627 ([1849] rev. ed. 1872 (government
non-interference in markets); id. at 566-570 (non-interference in most areas of belief and morals).
11. The classic study of conservatism in the United States, focusing on the period between the Civil
War and the New Deal, is CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA (1955).
12. See 2 WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630-1833: THE BAPTISTS AND THE
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 785-786, 1006-1024, 1093-1105 (1971). See also S.H. BEER,
THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 31-65 (1995); and see Barnes v. First Parrish, 6
Mass 334 (1810) (upholding state statute collecting taxes for the support of ministers in the
Congregational Church).
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that the state should be relatively active in economic planning and facilitation of growth.13
Nineteenth century classical legal thought came to wield the rhetoric of a liberal
economic philosophy with a much more conservative moral philosophy. Classical legal
thinkers drew their ideas about markets and economic regulation from the writings of the
classical political economists, both English and American. These writers generally
regarded markets as "natural" and self-executing, and as needing governmental
intervention only rarely. The period from the Jacksonian revolution in the 1820s to the end
of the nineteenth century was marked by ideological hostility toward the writers believed
was seriously excessive interference in the economy. The rhetoric of classical legal
thought was unabashedly laissez faire, urging the government to stay out of private
economic decision making as a general matter.14
During this classical period American political economists believed that government
intervention to redistribute wealth was bad on economic grounds: it distorted markets,
thereby reducing their efficiency, and destroyed incentives, thereby lowering productivity.
Extreme poverty could be relieved, but poor relief generally should be the work of private
charity. Classical legal thought generally followed with a narrow conception of the state's
role in determining the distribution of wealth.15
13. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1788-1800 at 107-131 (1993); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW: 1836-1937 (1991).
14. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY (1992); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 36-41, 171-206.
15. On the economics, see FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY
(1838); and 2 JOSEPH DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, 1606-1865 at
520, 557, 571-572, 592-593, 717, 734-735, 764, 793 (1946). On legal thought see THOMAS M.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 356 (1868) (attacking interference with private
property rights); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION 77 (1876) (taxation
must be for a "public" purpose); JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND
AMERICA 196-25 (1894) (attacking legislative interference in individual property rights);
CHRISTOPHER TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES vi-viii (1886) (describing his book as an effort to preserve laissez faire from legislative
attacks); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (striking down federal income
tax); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa.St. 431 (1886) (striking down statute preventing payment of
wages in script or other forms of paper than lawful money). See also OWEN FISS, TROUBLED
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 at 75-99 (Vol. VIII, The Oliver Wendell Holmes
Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1993); R. STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW
IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913 (1993); Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309 (1995).
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But these same classicists showed little reluctance about government regulation of
markets on moral grounds. For example, liberty of contract forbad the state from
regulating the hours of labor in an ordinary profession such as baking,16 but it did not
prevent the state from prohibiting marriage contracts between people of different races,17
from forcing businesses to close their doors on sunday, from enforcing broad regulation of
the sale of alcoholic beverages and even closing breweries that were legal when built
without compensation, or preventing lotteries or other forms of gambling.
For example, laissez faire Constitutional theorists such as Thomas M. Cooley were
steeped in classical political economy, and were thus opposed to both economic
regulation and protective labor legislation. But Cooley supported laws against blasphemy
and profanity. The state has the power to condemn language rising to the level of
"malicious ridicule of the Author and Founder of the Christian religion," Cooley concluded.
"The language which the Christian regards as blasphemous, no man in sound mind can
feel under a sense of duty to make use of under any circumstances, and no person is
therefore deprived of a right when he is prohibited, under penalties, from uttering it."
Likewise, the practice of using "profane and indecent language" ... "is reprobated by rightthinking men of every nation and every religious belief." Statutes condemning public
profanity "require no further justification than the natural impulses of every man who
believes in a Supreme Being and recognizes his right to the reverence of his creatures."18
The roots of this dualism lay in the same Jacksonian movement that eventually led
to the constitutionalization of classical political economy in the United States. Among its
many ideologies the Jacksonian movement represented a reaction of social and economic
outsiders to big government. But the big government that existed in the 1810s and 1820s
was not the social welfare state. Rather, it was a government that had heavily involved
itself in economic development. Good government, it was thought, did not redistribute
wealth. Rather, government should facilitate development by identifying areas where
more rapid growth was necessary, and then encourage private enterprise through a
variety of subsidies. These included corporate status, monopoly grants, tax exemptions or
other relief, outright cash subsidies, and a strong, federally managed currency.19
Although the principle may have been high minded, politics could not overlook the
16. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). See also 1 JOEL BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION §§680-695 (1891) (describing anti-miscegenation statutes,
and noting in §689 that they are constitutional under the Civil War amendments).
18. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, note __ (7th ed. 1903), at 671, 672, 674.
19. See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, note __ at 36-41.
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opportunities created by such policies. The recipients of the monopoly grants, tax
exemptions, and the like, were mainly those who had supported the politicians who were
handing them out. Central to the Jacksonian economic agenda was disentangling the
state from these corrupt bargains with private enterprise. In the Jacksonian rhetoric,
government regulation became little more than a euphemism for government intervention
in behalf of the privileged, giving them the advantage of relatively protected markets while
political outsiders were left to fight it out on farms or other industries that did not enjoy this
enormous largesse.
But the Jacksonian position on welfare and morality stands in sharp contrast to its
views on economics. First, the Federalists and Whigs who benefitted most from the
proactive economic policies of the early nineteenth century were typically from the more
established and elite American Churches. Their religion tended to be rational and
relatively orderly, emphasizing intellectual content over piety, and social relations over
antiworldliness.
By contrast, the Jacksonians were a diverse coalition of outsiders, many of them
quite fervent. Some, including Jackson's Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, were Catholics.20
Others were pro-revival evangelicals reacting against the cool rationalism of the
established churches.21 Although these groups were themselves quite different from each
other, as a collective they hardly stood for the proposition that the State should extricate
itself from moral affairs in the same way that it should remove itself from economic affairs.
Catholics, for example, came from a long tradition that was hostile to disestablishment and
inclined to mingle the Church and the State as regulators of behavior. Many of the
Jacksonian Protestant groups became fervent crusaders for state imposed morality.
Nevertheless, the story of Jacksonian religion is complex.22 First of all, a political
coalition between Protestant evangelicals and Catholics was no simple thing. Many of the
evangelical groups defined their very existence by their hatred of Catholicism, while
Catholics for their part saw no salvation outside of the Catholic Church. For this reason

20. On the makeup of the Jacksonian democrats, see GLYNDON G. VAN DUESEN, THE JACKSONIAN
ERA, 1828-1848 (1959) at 92-96 (noting that Jacksonianism was particularly popular among
immigrants, especially Irish Catholics).
21. See, e.g., CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815-1846 at
202-236 (1991).
22. For broadly divergent views, see ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 350-360
(1945) (emphasizing evangelical distrust of Jackson's non-denominationalism); JOHN WILLIAM
WARD, ANDREW JACKSON: SYMBOL FOR AN AGE 101-132 (1953) (emphasizing then popular view
that Jackson was a special divine messenger); SELLERS, MARKET REVOLUTION, ibid.
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many mainstream northern Baptists remained Whigs rather than joining the Jacksonians.23
Second, disestablishment itself was a Jacksonian phenomenon, at least in the more
conservative New England states such as Massachusetts and Connecticut.24 Although
Jackson himself was Presbyterian, he cultivated non-sectarianism and emphasized the
multi-denominational nature of his support. The Jackson era essentially gave us the
notion that the United States has a kind of Christian national religion that tolerates but also
transcends denominational differences.
One might wonder why a movement emphasizing disestablishment would retain
such fervor to use the state to regulate morals. But that is to read a twentieth-century
conception of disestablishment into the early nineteenth century. Historically,
disestablishment was largely a fiscal and institutional phenomenon rather than a moral
phenomenon. The primary issue in the establishment debate was the use of general tax
monies to pay the clergy and support church operations. Disestablishment had virtually
nothing to do with the state's power to regulate conduct.25 The early nineteenth century
controversy over disestablishment in America did not venture into such questions of
conduct as Bible reading or prayer in public schools or state regulation of mariage or
public morals.26 Indeed, many of the supporters of disestablishment, such as the
Catholics, were not in favor of disestablishment on principle at all. Rather, they preferred
disestablishment to any regime in which some other religious group, such as the dominant
Congregationalists, would be established.27
So it is not really ironic that disestablishment increased rather than decreased the
role of the State as regulator of moral conduct. This was not a function of
disestablishment itself, which pertained mainly to fiscal issues. Rather, the state's growing
moral hegemony was a consequence of the splintering of the Christian community that
had resulted from the Great Awakening and the Second Awakening -- two broadly
supported revival movements that divided the organized Protestant Churches and
contributed greatly to the proliferation of denominations we see today.
23. See MCLOUGHLIN, note __.
24. See 2 id. at 915-1063, 1189-1262.
25. See, e.g., id., where the debate in virtually every instance was over freedom to organize,
freedom to incorporate, or freedom from payment of a tax gather in behalf of the established
Church.
26. On the nature of the Jacksonian movement for separation of Church and state, see ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 350-360 (1945).
27. See Perry Miller, The Contribution of the Protestant Churches to the Religious Liberty in
Colonial America, 4 CHURCH HISTORY (Mar. 1935).
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The result of these divisions was that individual Protestant denominations
substantially lost the power to force specific religious views on anyone. But
notwithstanding theological division, the population was relatively united on a broad range
of morality questions. As a result, decisive coalitions sponsored statutes regulating
conduct on more general principles associated with Christian morality. The great reform
movements of the four decades before the Civil War were religiously motivated, heavily
Jacksonian or Whig.28 Their goal was the enactment of civil legislation not associated with
any denomination in particular, but with Christian values in general. These laws restricted
work or business on Sunday, manufacturing or consumption of alcoholic beverages,
gambling and lotteries, interracial marriage, eventually abortion,29 and other practices.
The revivals thus produce two phenomena: first, the splintering of the Protestant
Churches. But second, "reform" movements in which moral authority shifted significantly
away from the churches and to the state.
Citizen Welfare: Political Economy Without Utilitarian Ethics
The key to understanding classical welfare theory is that its speakers vehemently
accepted classical political economy but vehemently rejected utilitarian ethics.
Utilitarianism was nothing other than the extension into ethics of the same preferencebased principles that governed political economy. Twentieth century readers trained in the
preference driven ideas of neoclassical economics find it difficult to appreciate the
absolute abhorrence that pre-Civil War American political economists and moral
philosophers felt for utilitarianism.30
To be sure, this created a tension between the two disciplines. Both economics
and ethics were concerned with the same general goal: the maximization of human
happiness. But they approached that subject from different ways. Political economy was
concerned with the mechanisms by which the individual maximized his own happiness
through production and trading. Moral philosophy was concerned with how the individual
28. On religiously motivated reform movements during the years 1820-1860, see ROBERT H.
ABZUG, COSMOS CRUMBLING: AMERICAN REFORM AND THE RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION (1994).
29. See, e.g., JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
POLICY 119-146 (1978).
30. E.g., FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE 36 (1835) (concluding that
utilitarianism could be neither proven nor disproved from studying nature but was disproved by
scripture). On the strong aversion of elite American Protestants to utilitarianism, see DANIEL
WALKER HOWE, THE UNITARIAN CONSCIENCE: HARVARD MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 1805-1861 at 65-66
(1970). See also D.H. MEYER, THE INSTRUCTED CONSCIENCE: THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN
NATIONAL ETHIC (1972).
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maximized his happiness by determining the ethical course of action. Study of the two
disciplines was thought to facilitate common goals. John McVickar, a Columbia University
Professor who taught both political economy and moral philosophy, instructed his students
in the 1820s that "what religion condemns as contrary to duty and virtue, Political
Economy proves to be equally opposed to peace, good order, the permanent prosperity of
the community."31
Economics was concerned with the welfare of people in their present condition.
The problem with utilitarianism was that it threatened to turn ethics, just as economics, into
the study of what produces maximum satisfaction in post-fallen humanity. But under the
Protestant conception of human nature that prevailed among nineteenth century
Americans, the Fall clouded every aspect of human judgment. Depending on the
hardness of one's Calvinism, human judgments about right and wrong, about policy, about
religion and knowledge of God all were corrupted.32
Classical political economists generally shared these views, but believed that the
Fall had little impact for economic doctrine. Economics studied how people maximize their
desires given their situation. It was "pre-discounted," so to speak, for sin. A theory of
society, theology, or even natural science might be irremediably clouded by humanity's fall
from grace, and one studying those disciplines always knew that knowledge of God or the
Universe would have been much more perfect had mankind itself been perfect. But
economics was not concerned about the desires of some ideal or sinless humanity. It
considered human nature as it was found, warts and all.
The result of this perspective was strong individualism in economic theory, but
communitarianism in moral theory. Each person knew his own wants, and the science of
political economy was concerned with maximizing those wants without judging their
appropriateness. By contrast, the human being making moral decisions has little about
which to be self-assured. He cannot trust his own judgment, for his baser instincts are
always likely to take over. He finds his moral compass in stable institutions, orthodoxy,
and the community.
31. John McVickar, "Concluding Remarks," in JAMES R. MCCULLOCH, OUTLINES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 136-137 (McVickar, ed., 1825).
32. For example, consider WAYLAND, MORAL SCIENCE, note __ at 102:
[T]hough our first parents were endowed with a perfect moral constitution, yet it was
necessary that God should make to them a special revelation respecting some portion of his
will.... How much more evidently is additional light necessary when it is remembered that
the moral constitution of man seems manifestly to be imperfect.... We act according to the
impulsions of blind, headlong passion, regardless of our own best good and of the welfare of
others, in despite of what we know to be the will of our Marker....
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This difference emerges strong already in the father of classical political economy:
Adam Smith. Smith's economic man, displayed in the Wealth of Nations always knows
precisely what he wants; it's only a matter of making the trades that will get him to that
point.33 In sharp contrast, the moral actor of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, written
seventeen years earlier, is always groping in the dark and distinguishing right from wrong
by observing the actions of those around him. Smith's moral philosophy was concerned
with the absolute nature of things in areas where humanity's fallen powers proved
particularly disabling.
Thus economics and politics were both applied sciences concerned with
maximizing the welfare of post-fallen humanity. Notwithstanding the fall, the world
remained an impressively orderly place. In this sense, Smith was a pure product of his
Enlightenment Era. The economic market was for him a work of pure beauty and
orderliness just as the chemical tables were for Joseph Priestly, or the ordering of species
for Thomas Jefferson.34 The greatest manifestation of God's creative power was that the
world did not need to be continually corrected or fixed. Smith wrote in Sentiments:
In every part of the universe we observe means adjusted with the nicest artifice to
the ends which they are intended to produce; and in the mechanism of a plant, or
animal body, admire how every thing is contrived for advancing the two great
purposes of nature, the support of the individual and the propagation of the species.
...
The wheels of the watch are all admirably adjusted to the end for which it was
made, the pointing of the hour. All their various motions conspire in the nicest
manner to produce this effect. If they were endowed with a desire and intention to
produce it, they could not do it better. Yet we never ascribe any such desire or
intention to them, but to the watch-maker, and we know that they are put into
motion by a spring, which intends the effect it produces as little as they do. But
though, in accounting for the operations of bodies, we never fail to distinguish in this
manner the efficient from the final cause, in accounting for those of the mind, we
are very apt to confound these two different things with one another.... [As a result,]
we are very apt ... to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which in reality is the
wisdom of God.
The study of morals, by contrast, required one to look away from the watch itself
33. E.g., ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(1776), Bk. I, chs. 1-2 (showing how the division of nature evolved from each individual's continual
efforts to maximize his own wants).
34. See, e.g., DANIEL R. BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1948).
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and toward the watch maker. Smith thus distinguished the science of morals and the
science of economics this way:
The administration of the great system of the universe, however, the care of the
universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God and
not of man. To man is allotted a much humbler department, but one much more
suitable to the weakness of his powers, and to the narrowness of his
comprehension; the care of his own happiness, of that of his family....35
For Smith, the science of economics concerned how fallen human beings
maximized their actual desires in a fallen world. By contrast, the science of morals
required them to transcend their fallen status and objectify their sinful nature. In this task,
humanity needed a great deal of help -- from the Bible, from tradition and authority, from
history and trial and error. The result is that while Smith's economics is radically
individualistic, his moral theory is based on continuous interpersonal comparison. For
example, he described the student of morals as an "impartial spectator," writing:
...we either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we feel that,
when we place ourselves in the situation of another man, and view it, as it were
with his eyes and from his station, we either can or cannot entirely enter into and
sympathize with the sentiments and motives which influenced it. We can never
survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form any judgment
concerning them, unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural
station, and endeavor to view them as at a certain distance from us. But we can do
this in no other way than by endeavoring to view them with the eyes of other
people, or as other people are likely to view them. Whatever judgment we can form
concerning them, accordingly, must always bear some secret reference, either to
what are, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or ... ought to be the
judgment of others."36
Thus, Smith concluded, someone growing up in absolute isolation would have no
reference point for making moral judgments at all. But "bring him into society, and he is
immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. It is placed in the
countenance and behavior of those he lives with.... and it is here that he first views the
propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and deformity of his own
mind."37
35. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 168-169, 386 ([1759] Liberty Edition
reprint, 1976).
36. SMITH, MORAL SENTIMENTS, id. at 203-204.
37. Id. at 204.
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So Smith's economic actor is a radical individualist who knows what he wants and
acts accordingly. It is not economics' job to evaluate the quality of human desires, but only
to study the most efficacious ways by which they may be attained. In sharp contrast,
Smith's moral actor is foundering in a giant, unknown ocean hoping for any glimpse of
something that will give him his bearings.
Such individualism in economics and communitarianism in morals dominated
orthodox American thought in the nineteenth century and explains how American law
could be so preoccupied with "liberty of contract" in economic matters, to the point of
condemning numerous regulatory statutes under the Constitution; but then could readily
approve serious interferences with liberty of contract when morals were at stake. For
example, Brown University's Francis Wayland authored texts in both political economy and
moral philosophy. Wayland's economic actor always knows what he wants and then
seeks to maximize. By contrast, his moral actor must rely on a fallen conscience, or
"moral sense," that is constantly in need of crutches. The moral faculty is constantly
impaired, wrote Wayland, when people observe the unpunished wrongful acts of others.
Wayland's individual simply has no moral compass -- even when he wishes to please God,
he may do it on his own by sacrificing animals or even human beings. The guidance
needed to act ethically comes from a continuous blend of mutual restraint and divine
revelation.38
Classical Legal Thought and State Regulation of Morals
As noted previously, the Progressive attack on substantive due process was
motivated, not by its Jacksonian origin, but rather because this same hostility toward
regulation assumed a much different political character when the regulation at issue was
not a monopoly grant but rather a wage-and-hour law directed at protecting the working
poor. Further, the Progressive literature misrepresented substantive due process by
presenting it as reflecting a classical hostility toward all forms of regulation. Nevertheless,
anti-regulation fervor, which had been a left-leaning ideology in the 1820s was seen by
Progressives as a right-leaning ideology at century's end.39
While Jacksonians were laissez faire in their economics, however, they were also
Christians with a strong tendency toward evangelical moralism. Demographically, this is
hardly surprising. Included among the Jacksonians was a broad coalition of Catholics and
revivalist evangelicals who approached their religion with enthusiasm and showed little
38. FRANCIS WAYLAND, MORAL SCIENCE, note __ at 79-86 (1835); and FRANCIS WAYLAND,
ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1837).
39. See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, note __, at Chs. 1-6; HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 1-44 (1993).
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reluctance about involving the state in "reform," defined by explicitly Christian principles.40
The Jacksonian movement bound diverse Catholic, evangelical and other groups into a
common cause in a way that enabled the religious among them to set aside theological
differences, at least for political purposes.
Jacksonian religion was certainly not calculated to preclude the state from
regulating morality, in the way that Jacksonian economics abhorred economic regulation.
Indeed, the case for morals regulation became even stronger. The Jacksonians were the
first American political party to accept denominational diversity as a fact of life. The
proliferation of church divisions that accompanied early nineteenth century revivalism
significantly broke down the political authority of any single Church. The state then picked
up where the churches left off. The result is that the period 1820-1860 produced great
movements for legislative regulation of such vices as gambling, consumption of alcohol,
and sabbath breaking.41 The impetus for reform came not only from Jacksonians, but also
from middle class whigs. Aghast at the breakdown of religious uniformity, they began
extensive campaigns against such vices as alcohol consumption thought to be particularly
prevalent among the lower classes.42 The temperance movement itself originated among
New England's Whigs and was in large part directed at members of the Jacksonian
coalition -- for example, poor European immigrants, who were believed to be heavy
drinkers.43 As a result, the regulatory state remained alive and well.
Lotteries
Because it is essentially contractual, the lottery is a striking example of the
divergence between economic individualism and moral communitarianism in classical
welfare policy. Just as economic classicism and antistatism were becoming triumphant as
economic theories, the American position on lotteries was changing from one of
government toleration and use to one of hostility and strict regulation.
Lotteries had been common in colonial America among all except Quakers,44 and
40. See SELLERS, note __ at 232-236.
41. See generally Abzug, note __; N. O. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN
CHRISTIANITY (1989); GEORGE H. THOMAS, REVIVALISM AND CULTURAL CHANGE: CHRISTIANITY,
NATION BUILDING, AND THE MARKET IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1989);
TIMOTHY L. SMITH, REVIVALISM AND SOCIAL REFORM: AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM ON THE EVE OF
THE CIVIL WAR (1957).
42. See ABZUG, note __ at 102.
43. See SELLERS, MARKET REVOLUTION, note __ at 261-263.
44. See LESTER G.LINDLEY, CONTRACT, ECONOMIC CHANGE, AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER IN
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were commonly used to finance public works,45 as part of church building campaigns,46
and to support construction of educational facilities.47 Indeed, Churches were among the
most common users of lotteries.48 Alexander Hamilton supported their use to finance
public works projects,49 and the Continental Congress passed a resolution in 1775 "[t]hat a
sum of money be raised by way of lottery for defraying the expense" of the anticipated
military campaign.50 In 1812 Congress authorized lotteries to raise money for street
improvements in Washington, D.C, and by 1820 it had authorized them about seventy
times for various public works projects.51 Consistent with this, lottery contracts were
enforceable under the American common law. Although there was some statutory
regulation of lotteries in the eighteenth century, it was designed to give states a monopoly
rather than to forbid them.52
But early in the nineteenth century evangelicals launched a campaign against
lotteries, and anti-lottery legislation became common in the 1820s and 1830s.53 New York
INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA 29 (1993).
45. See JOHN L. THOMAS, THE LAW OF LOTTERIES, FRAUDS AND OBSCENITY IN THE MAILS 4 (1900)
(lotteries were used, among other purposes, to finance dredging of the Hudson river, for the
construction of orphanages, and building schools). See also JOEL P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF STATUTORY CRIMES 582-587 (1873); and see generally Stephen Siegel, Joel Bishop's
Orthodoxy, 13 L. & HIST. REV. 215 (1995).
46. See 2 ANSON P. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (1950).
47. See JOHN SAMUEL EZELL, FORTUNE'S MERRY WHEEL: THE LOTTERY IN AMERICA 20-25 (1960).
48. See A.R. Spofford, Lotteries in American History 177, 1892 Annual Report, American
Historical Association (1893).
49. See 1 JOSEPH S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS, 349,
380-381, 385, 520-521; and see Appendix B, 520-522.
50. 1. J. Cont. Cong. 535 (1775), quoted in Thomas, note __ at 6.
51. THOMAS, LAW OF LOTTERIES, note __ at 6-7.
52. Id. at 4.
53. The sharp switch in viewpoint was motivated substantially by JOB TYSON, BRIEF SURVEY OF
THE GREAT EXTENT AND EVIL TENDENCIES OF THE LOTTERY SYSTEM, AS EXISTING IN THE UNITED
STATES (1833), which argued that lotteries were conducive to sloth and immorality, and particularly
harsh on the poor, who were often seduced by them. Tyson produced evidence from Philadelphia
county that lottery ticket purchases were common causes of insolvency, and that they frequently
contributed to embezzlement and forgery. See LINDLEY, note__ at 64-68.
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adopted a statute in 1821 and a stronger statute in 1833. Connecticut and Virginia
followed in 1834.54 The first Supreme Court decision upholding a statute forbidding
lotteries came in a dispute challenging a prior state policy of encouraging them. In 1829
the Virginia legislature had authorized a corporation to use a lottery to finance a Turnpike,
but in 1834 it passed another statute condemning lotteries, but permitting previously
approved lotteries to continue until 1837. The Company then challenged the limitation as
an impairment of a pre-existing contract. The Court found no impairment,55 but in the
process indicated how much opinion about lotteries had changed in just a short time.
Referring to them, it said:
The suppression of nuisances injurious to public health or morality is among the
most important duties of government. Experience has shown that the common
forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the
widespread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few persons and
places, but the latter infests the whole community: it enters every dwelling; it
reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earnings of the poor; it plunders the
ignorant and simple.56
Thirty years later the Supreme Court went much further.57 In 1867 the Mississippi
legislature had given a twenty-five year charter to the Mississippi Agricultural, Educational,
and Manufacturing Aid Society to issue lottery tickets, but then the state amended its
constitution a year later to declare that "the legislature shall never authorize any lottery, nor
shall the sale of lottery tickets be allowed...."
Acknowledging that the corporate charter at issue was covered by the contract
clause, the Supreme Court held that a state could not repudiate its "police power" to make
laws affecting the "public health or the public morals." The Court acknowledged that
"formerly, when the sources of public revenue were fewer than now, they [lotteries] were
used in some or all of the States, and even the District of Columbia, to raise money for the
erection of public buildings, making public improvements, and not infrequently for
educational and religious purposes." However, subsequent learning had revealed the
dangers of lotteries to public morals: "that they are demoralizing in their effects, no matter
how carefully regulated, cannot admit of a doubt." In sum, the regulation of public morals
operated as a exception to the contract clause. "No legislature can bargain away the
54. 2 STOKES, note __ at 26.
55. It held that the legislature could competently place a time limit that had not been express, but
must have been implied, in the pre-existing license. Phalen v. Virginia, 8 Howard 164, 168 (1850).
56. Id. at 168.
57. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 815 (1880).
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public health or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their
servants."58 In the process, the Supreme Court gave about as narrow an interpretation of
the contract clause as had ever been applied to a state grant, and completely out of step
with the dominant contract clause decisions of the nineteenth century:
Any one . . . who accepts a lottery charter does so with the implied understanding
that the people, in their sovereign capacity, and through their properly constituted
agencies, may resume it at any time when the public good shall require, whether it
be paid for or not. All that one can get by such a charter is a suspension of certain
governmental rights in his favor, subject to withdrawal at will.59
The next major lottery campaign was against the Louisiana Lottery of the 1870's,
which was widely promoted to ticket buyers scattered across the country. That "abuse"
became the target of President Benjamin Harrison's reform agenda in the early 1890's,
and eventually federal legislation forbidding the sale of lottery tickets in the mail.60 That
statute was upheld in Champion v. Ames as a legitimate exercise of the federal commerce
power and not in violation of the Tenth Amendment.61 After quoting its earlier decisions
about the immoralities of lotteries, the Supreme Court concluded:
If a state, when considering legislation for the suppression of lotteries within its own
limits, may properly take into view the evils that inhere in the raising of money, in
that mode, why may not Congress, invested with the power to regulate commerce
among the several states, provide that such commerce shall not be polluted by the
carrying of lottery tickets from one state to another?62
The Court concluded:
In legislating upon the subject of the traffic in lottery tickets, as carried on through
58. Id. at 818-819. In this sense, Stone is an important precursor of the public trust doctrine, which
prohibited a state from granting away land which it held in a fictional trust for the public. See
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 10-12 (1990).
59. Id. at 821. See also Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1897), permitting Kentucky to amend
its constitution so as to require municipalities to renege on pre-existing lottery contracts. On the
contract clause in the early nineteenth century, see HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, note __.
60. See EZELL, note __ at 263-269; LINDLEY, note __, at 70-75.
61. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
62. Champion, 188 U.S. at 356.
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interstate commerce, Congress only supplemented the action of those
states--perhaps all of them--which, for the protection of the public morals, prohibit
the drawing of lotteries, as well as the sale or circulation of lottery tickets, within
their respective limits. It said, in effect, that it would not permit the declared policy
of the states, which sought to protect their people against the mischiefs of the
lottery business, to be overthrown or disregarded by the agency of interstate
commerce. We should hesitate long before adjudging that an evil of such appalling
character, carried on through interstate commerce, cannot be met and crushed by
the only power competent to that end.63
The Early Campaigns Against Alcohol
Campaigns for legislation against alcohol consumption began at the same time as
the anti-lottery movement. Historically, Americans drank with little sense of moral
stigma.64 But beginning in the late 1820s, evangelical churches began a campaign
against the evils of liquor that continued through the 1920's. Originally, the campaign
manifested itself largely in sermons and tracts urging people to avoid alcoholic beverages.
But in the 1830s the American Temperance Society, the leading anti-alcohol group,
abandoned its previous policy of moral persuasion in favor of legislative prohibition.65 By
the end of the 1850s many states had passed statutes limiting or prohibiting the
consumption of alcoholic beverages.66 Numerous mid- and late- nineteenth century
Supreme Court decisions involved Constitutional challenges to statutes that closed down
breweries or bars, or forbad trade in alcoholic beverages. The Court often upheld these
statutes under circumstances where a similar interference would have been struck down -namely, when the businesses were completely legal when first built and then closed
without any compensation to their owners.67
Sunday laws
Although Christians had always taken their holy day seriously and Sabbath
63. Id. at 357-358.
64. See ABZUG, note __ at 82.
65. ABZUG, note __ at 102; I. TYRRELL, SOBERING UP: FROM TEMPERANCE TO PROHIBITION IN
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA, 1800-1860 (1979) at 159-224.
66. Tyrrell, ibid. For a good, brief survey of the law, see ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER:
PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 192-219 (1904).
67. See, e.g., Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925 (state may seize liquor in the home that had
been lawfully acquired for home consumption, but subsequently forbidden by statute).
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breaking was an offense even in the Colonies, evangelicals pursued it with a new vigor
beginning in the 1820s.68 In part, this was a consequence of the "market revolution" that
put so many people at work in the commercial marketplace rather than home on the farm.
Laws that prevented the conducting of business on Sunday -- a seemingly clear invasion
of liberty of contract -- were justified with the observation that the citizenry was
overwhelmingly Christian, no matter what the sect, and that Christians in general believed
that Sunday should be a day of rest. Indeed, many state courts began making common
law rules that limited the enforcement of contracts negotiated on Sunday -- even as they
were expanding liberty of contract as a general matter.69
State Regulation and the Centrality of Moral Science
For Calvinistic Puritans in the seventeenth century, the moral law consisted of
God's commands. God was perfect and only he knew and proclaimed the moral, which
fallen humanity was unable to know on its own. But by the mid-nineteenth century,
mainstream American Protestants and moral philosophers had modified this view and
began to see morality as something both discoverable, within limits, and as capable of
being rationalized.70 Thus, "moral science" existed because humanity was capable of
knowing something of the moral simply by studying human actions and desires as well as

68. See Wyatt-Brown, Prelude to Abolitionism: Sabbatarian Politics and the Rise of the Second
Party System, 58 J.AM.HIS. 316 (Sep. 1971); PAUL JOHNSON, A SHOPKEEPER'S MILLENNIUM:
SOCIETY AND REVIVALS IN ROCHESTER, NEW YORK, 1815-1837 (1978).
69. On expansion of economic liberty of contract in the state courts during this time, see GILLMAN,
note __ at 61-100. But the same courts both upheld statutes and cited common law principles that
otherwise perfectly lawful contracts became unenforceable if made on Sunday. See, e.g., Hulett v.
Stratton, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 539 (1850) (contract made on Sunday to sell a horse is unenforceable);
Murphy v. Simpson, 14 B.Mon. (Ky.) 419 (1854) (same, interpreting a statute); Lyon v. Strong, 6
Vt. 219 (1834) (same, interpreting a statute; "No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his
cause of action upon an illegal or immoral act.... The contract is bottomed in malum prohibitum of
a very serious nature...." Finding authorities "clear and decisive" as to non-enforceability of
contracts made on the sabbath. Id. at 224-225); Sayre v. Wheeler, 31 Iowa 112 (1870) (refusing to
enforce promissory note executed on Sunday; applying statute); Adams v. Hamell, 2 Doug. (Mich.)
73 (1845) (same); Pike v. King, 16 Iowa 49 (1864) (interpreting statute, refusing to enforce contract
for sale of property made on Sunday: "... but this occurred on the Lord's day, and a party cannot be
heard to allege his own unlawful act."). For numerous additional decisions, see ELISHA
GREENHOOD, THE DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC POLICY IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, REDUCED TO RULES
549-551 (1886).
70. The classic discussion of this transformation is JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN, PIETY VERSUS
MORALISM: THE PASSING OF THE NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY (1932).
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the constitution of the universe.71 Nineteenth century American moral philosophers
continued to believe in absolute rights and wrongs, but they were convinced that these
absolutes lay within the observable structure of the universe itself, and not merely in God's
pronouncements – that is, they were part of an “instructed” conscience.72 They could be
discerned to some extent from general revelation (nature) and not merely from special
revelation (the Bible).
Equally important was the fact that this moral science was "non-denominational," in
the sense that the principles it produced did not vary much according to the particular
Protestant sect of the writer. Thus, for example, the moral science of a Unitarian such as
Harvard's Francis Bowen closely resembles that of a Baptist such as Brown University's
Francis Wayland, notwithstanding the bitter antagonism of the two groups in matters of
theology.73 From this moral science, American Protestants developed a conception of a
"moral law" that was both "natural" and discoverable in much the same way that the
natural laws of the physical universe or the basic principles of the common law were
thought to be discoverable. From inner feelings of moral obligation one could discern the
moral structure of the universe and even the existence of God. As Archibald Alexander, a
prominent Presbyterian theologian and moral philosopher put it:
The feeling of moral obligation which accompanies every perception of right and
wrong seems to imply that man is under law; for what is moral obligation but a
moral law? And if we are under a law there must be a lawgiver, a moral governor,
who has incorporated the elements of this law into our very constitution."74
The nineteenth century moral scientist thus claimed his discipline was just as scientific as
the natural sciences were. Wayland opened his Elements of Moral Science by comparing
moral law with Newton's laws of physics, the laws of chemistry, and the axioms of
mathematics, and finding them to have the same scientific status.75

71. For the historical roots of these developments in ethics, see NORMAN FIERING, MORAL
PHILOSOPHY AT SEVENTEENTH CENTURY HARVARD: A DISCIPLINE IN TRANSITION (1981).
72. See DONALD H. MEYER, THE INSTRUCTED CONSCIENCE: THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN
NATIONAL ETHIC 89-91 (1972).
73. See FRANCIS BOWEN, LOWELL LECTURES, ON THE APPLICATION OF METAPHYSICAL AND
ETHICAL SCIENCE TO THE EVIDENCES OF RELIGION (1849); WAYLAND, MORAL SCIENCE, note __.
74. ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER, OUTLINES OF MORAL SCIENCE 209-210 (1852).
75. WAYLAND, MORAL SCIENCE, note __ at 17. On the scientific status accorded to moral science,
see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN AMERICA, 1800-1860 at 100-115 (1978).
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While political economy was concerned with maximizing individual wealth or
comfort given humanity's fallen state, moral science was concerned with maximizing
human happiness given the consequences of the fall. The result was radical individualism
in the management of economic markets, but complete dependency in the management of
morals. As Jacksonian Presbyterian and classical political economist Henry Vethake put
in it the 1844 edition of his treatise on political economy, the moral philosopher is
concerned with such questions as whether man's desires are appropriate or moral under
the circumstances, whether men may want things that will be injurious to themselves, or
whether men have a duty to give to others rather than maximizing their own wealth. But
none of these concerns is in the province of political economy. Rather, "the political
economist regards every thing as useful which is capable of satisfying, in any degree
whatever, any of man's actual wants and desires." Vethake gave this example:
Thus spirituous liquors are said to be possessed of utility, because they are of a
nature to be objects of men's desire; which desire they evince, and afford a
measure of, by the sacrifices they are willing to make in order to obtain them; and
this utility is ascribed to those articles, notwithstanding that their use may, in most
cases, be justly condemned,...
So the treatment of liquor as a subject of human desire presented a question of political
economy; but its social and more long-lasting implications for physical or moral health
presented a question of moral science. Thus the difference between the political economy
and moral science is that political economy considers man as he "is," and is not concerned
with "the moral improvement of the species," concluded Vethake, while the study of morals
considers man as he "ought to be."76
Vethake later elaborated on this distinction, in discussing the duty of government.
Like most Jacksonians, he abhorred state interference in private markets.77 But that
raised the problem of goods such as alcohol, whose very consumption might be
considered immoral. "There are some articles, to consume which, or to consume which to
the extent in which they are actually consumed, has an injurious effect upon society."
Conceding the power of the state to condemn such consumption on moral grounds, can
the state derive any additional arguments from political economy to justify such regulation.
Vethake concluded that the answer must be no. Political economy must treat the human
being as it finds him, and if his desire is to consume excessive amounts of liquor, then that
76. HENRY VETHAKE, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 14 (1844). On Vethake, see
JOSEPH DORFMAN AND REXFORD TUGWELL, EARLY AMERICAN POLICY: SIX COLUMBIA
CONTRIBUTORS 155-204 (1960).
77. See, Id. at 322-331 (attacking wealth distribution legislation and unionism); 332-335 (attacking
hours legislation as costing workers more in lost wages than they would gain from reduced hours of
labor); 343-356 (attacking welfare for the poor and unemployment compensation).
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utility must be regarded by the political economist as equivalent to the utility produced by
any other good, such as food or clothing. "Politico-economically speaking, all these, being
objects of men's desire, are to be regarded as useful objects; and their utility to any
individual, in the circumstances in which he is actually placed, must be estimated by the
labour, or the products of labour, which he is willing to give in exchange for them...." Thus,
"the argument against the use of spirituous liquors, in so far as it applies with greater force
to those liquors than to any other article of consumption, is altogether a moral one...."78
By and large mainstream American Protestants in the mid-nineteenth century -Jacksonian, Whig and Republican alike -- embraced self-interest and maximization as
economic principles, but abhorred them as ethical principles. Francis Wayland, the antiJacksonian President of Brown University, provides a good example. Although he was not
a particularly original thinker, he is one of the best mirrors of conservative social thought in
America at the middle of the nineteenth century. Wayland fancied himself a kind of
American facsimile of Adam Smith. Just as Smith had published his Theory of the Moral
Sentiments and then his Wealth of Nations, so Wayland published his Elements of Moral
Science in 1835 and his Elements of Political Economy in 1837. And just as Smith,
Wayland regarded his two books as developing related parts of a single system of social
philosophy, one in social ethics and one in political economy.
The principles of political economy, Wayland observed, "are so closely analogous
to those of Moral Philosophy, that almost every question in one, may be argued on
grounds belonging to the other."79 But while Wayland's Political Economy was an
extended argument for laissez faire, designed to show that self-interest and free trading
yields the optimal allocation of economic resources, his Moral Science was an extended
argument against utilitarian ethics, or the idea that rightness or wrongness of any action
should be based on the net value or attractiveness of its consequences. Indeed, Wayland
abhorred any notion that morality was related to consequences.
For Wayland, "Right and wrong depend upon the relations under which we are
created and the obligations resulting from them, and are in their nature immutable." But
this creation was subsequently corrupted by the fall. "[T]hough our first parents were
endowed with a perfect moral constitution," he concluded, that constitution had been
rendered "imperfect" by the fall, and people thus needed external authority to prevent them
from following their baser instincts.80
For Wayland, the principal duty of government was to stay out of the economy, but
78. Id. at 306-307.
79. WAYLAND, POLITICAL ECONOMY, note __ at 131.
80. WAYLAND, MORAL SCIENCE, note __ at 100-102.
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to intervene where "moral restraint" in the individual left off. Given man's fallen nature, he
always had the tendency toward theft, adultery, or other sins, even though God's
revelations (through both nature and the Bible) instructed him that these acts were wrong.
Government was then needed to supplement moral restraint. As a result, the amount of
government a society required depended entirely on the degree of individual moral
restraint its members exhibited. If individuals were well behaved, little state force would be
needed and the sovereign could maintain order by appealing to conscience. In other
situations, however, "[a] people may be so entirely surrendered to the influence of passion
and so feebly influenced by moral restraint that a government which relied upon moral
restraint could not exist for a day."81 Such a government would have to rely on coercion to
ensure its members' moral behavior. "God has rendered the blessing of freedom
inseparable from moral restraint in the individual; and hence it is vain for a people to
expect to be free unless they are first willing to be virtuous."82
After the Civil War moral philosophy as an academic discipline gradually
disappeared from American universities. As American academics began to wrestle with
Charles Darwin, ethics became more anthropological, relativistic, and utilitarian.83 But the
message of the moral philosophers survived largely intact in the writings of the great
Constitutional scholars of the middle and late nineteenth century, and right through the
substantive due process era. Their message largely preserved the classical position that
on largely individualist principles, the state must stay out of the economy; but on largely
communitarian principles, the state should have a relatively free hand in the regulation of
morals.
The University of Chicago's Ernst Freund, one of the most astute scholars of state
regulatory power, noted this bifurcation in his 1904 treatise on the Police Power. While
contracts were the ultimate expression of individual preference, even if idiosyncratic,
Freund observed, the maintenance of physical and moral standards "depends upon
conditions affecting a considerable number of people alike," and thus justifies the state's
role. In fact, this use is the police power in the narrowest sense of the term. "It is a power
so vital to the community that it is often conceded to local authorities of limited powers."
To this end, economic interests were different than the state's concern with order and
morals. To be sure, "Wealth is almost as essential to our civilization as safety, order, and
morals; but while these can be secured to a substantial degree by restraint, the acquisition
of wealth is based on active efforts; and while systematic restraint proceeds naturally from
government, active effort must be chiefly individual." Government restraint in this area
81. Id. at 327 (emphasis in original).
82. Id. at 327.
83. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1991); DONALD
MEYER, INSTRUCTED CONSCIENCE, note __ at 123-132.
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always operates as either "favoritism or oppression." As a result, "The cultivation of moral,
intellectual and aesthetic forces and interests which advance civilization and benefit the
community...cannot be a matter of indifference to the state. This domain was formerly left
to the church...." Unfortunately, the latter had now lost its authority, and the state had to fill
the vacancy.84
Freund found three "spheres of activities" subject to the police power. First is a
"conceded sphere" involving public safety, order and morals, where the policy power is
continually growing. Second is a "debatable sphere" concerning the proper production
and distribution of wealth; here, legislation is still in an "experimental stage." Third is an
"exempt sphere" of moral, intellectual and political movements where the constitution gives
individuals freedom from state control. Importantly, the spheres "may overlap," leading to
complex questions. For example, "religion and speech and press are primarily free, but
that does not prevent them from being subjected to restraints in the interest of good order
or morality." He added that "Very little difficulty has so far been encountered in the mutual
adjustment of these interests." 85
Notwithstanding fundamental similarity in their outlooks, important differences exist
between Wayland's position in the 1830s and Freund's at the turn of the century. Freund
was much more concerned than Wayland with state infringements that are not well
designed to protect the community as a whole, but rather are calculated, paternalistically,
to protect the individual from his own self-abuse. Freund noted, for example, that
regulation of gambling was lawful as a general proposition, even though it was highly
paternalistic, "[P]rotecting the individual from temptation and restraining him from acts,
which, while hurtful to him, are not immediately offensive to others, and while of evil
example, do not in any way affect any one else's liberty of action."86 Freund admitted he
would have great difficulty with regulation of liquor consumption if drinking harmed only the
drinker himself. But since it was widely known that the damage of drunkenness quickly
extends to others and even the entire community, regulation was appropriate.87
In sum, from the 1830s to the turn of the century a noticeable shift occurs in the
grounds for regulation of morals. In the earlier period a communitarian ethics justified
regulation of morals even for vices that produced no obvious victims other than the abuser
himself. By the end of the century, however, writers like Freund were noticeably disturbed
by state regulation of victimless vices and began to justify such regulation only by finding
84. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (1904),
quotes from §500 at 537, §10 at 7, §12 at 8, §13 at 9.
85

Id., §15 at 11.
86. FREUND, id. at §188, at 173.
87. Id. at §204, at 192-193.
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innocent victims.
Regulation and the Social Contract in Nineteenth Century American Legal Thought
Nineteenth century American moral philosophers wrote about political ideas in a
way that later critics regarded as derivative, sanctimonious, or even silly.88 Their work is
often regarded as a synthesis of unoriginal borrowings from great western political ideas
and orthodox biblical proscriptions. The result is that most of what passed for philosophy
in the United States before Pragmatism is simply not taken seriously.
Francis Wayland's discussion of the social contract, perhaps the greatest western
political idea, provokes just such a reaction. Like most orthodox nineteenth century
American thinkers, Wayland's theory of society was contractarian, borrowed mainly from
Locke's Two Treatises of Government and Puritan covenant theology, which was itself
heavily contractarian.89
For Wayland as for orthodox moralists generally, however, the vice of the Lockean
social contract was the obvious one that it permitted private preferences to define not
merely the citizen's rights and obligations in the economic sphere but also in matters of
morals. For that reason Wayland regarded the Lockean social contract made by people
in a state of nature as naive, and perhaps characteristic only of a "simple society." This
original social contract was necessary to facilitate the division of labor essential to
prosperity, and to protect property rights. To this point Wayland's social contract was
purely economic. But then Wayland noted that modern man was not living in this simple
contractarian society, but rather in a more complex "civil society" in which "social contract"
was little more than a figure of speech. Although it is sometimes helpful to think of modern
civil society as founded on a social contract, said Wayland, in fact it is much more. God
himself ordains civil society, and it is founded on his principles. This meant that society
was obliged to conform to certain "social laws" notwithstanding that majority vote, or the
social contract, might dictate differently.90
For orthodox moralists such as Wayland, the most fundamental problem with the
88. See, e.g., HARRY W. SCHNEIDER, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 196 (2d ed. 1963)
(placing the period under the general heading of "orthodoxy" and describing most of it as "wormy
knowledge."); 1 ELIZABETH FLOWER & MURRAY MURPHEY, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN
AMERICA 203 (1977) ("Whatever the label, this realism is now uniformly regarded as a wasteland of
secondhand ideas servicing orthodox Calvinism.")
89. On contractarianism in American Puritan theology, see PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND
MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 365-462 (Beacon Press ed. 1961).
90. WAYLAND, MORAL SCIENCE, note __ at 306, 313-314.
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social contract is that it gave the community a moral sense only a little greater than that of
the individual members. To be sure, the social contract itself served to increase morality
somewhat. For example, each person individually would prefer to steal the property of
others, but he would also prefer not to have his property stolen, so he enters into a social
contract that protects property rights and agrees to have rules imposed upon himself that
serve to constrain his own baser instincts.91 But this in itself was not enough. Since God
ordained society, it had to be formed in conformity to his will, and such a society would not
come about simply by the mutual bargaining of society's members. This entailed that
political leadership be guided, not merely by the voice of the people, but also by moral law
and divine revelation.
Thus Wayland's social contract theory "socializes" issues of morality at two different
levels. First, the basic principle of self interest that governs all contracting forces
participants to insist on community moral standards. In economics, they want free
bargaining; but in morality, they want assurance that others will be restrained from
exercising the same depraved instincts they feel in themselves. As a result, even the
purely economic, self-interested individual bargains for a higher level of state enforced
morality than he would exercise himself if given his absolute freedom.
But second, even this higher level of morality is not enough. That society must also
be in conformity to God's will. At this point, Wayland strains the contractarian analogy to
its limits. Why would self-interested individuals bargain for a society in conformity with
God's will? The answer was the same one that Pascal reached in his famous wager.92 If
the bargainers are all believing Christians who fear the eternal consequences of a godforsaking society, they will also bargain for a society that lives according to Christian
principles. Further, however, although these people would bargain for a moral society
governed under Christian principles, they would also realize that their understanding of
these principles is imperfect. That would create a further social obligation to study God's
revelation and to develop specific social principles in accordance with it.93
For Wayland as for other classical moralists, this perspective on government led,
somewhat unpredictably, to innovative and democratic theories of civic responsibility and
education. In the early nineteenth century higher education in the United States was still
based largely on the "classical" model as offered in the great English Universities, Oxford
and Cambridge. Under this system higher education was available only to the elite, and its
focus was on the classical languages and theology. But during the nineteenth century
America higher education was greatly expanded and made available to a much larger
91. Id. at 318.
92. See BLAISE PASCAL, PENSEES 233, 418 [c. 1662] (W.F.Trotter, trans. 1958).
93. Id. at 322-323.
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percentage of people. Further, the curriculum changed away from the classical languages
and toward practical knowledge such as science, together with a very strong dose of moral
philosophy, civic virtue and social responsibility.94
Moral Regulation in the Substantive Due Process Treatise Tradition
Even as they defended liberty of contract and railed against state economic
regulation, the classical law treatise writers generally acknowledged that the state's "police
power," or general regulatory power,95 permitted regulation of those aspects of conduct
that were sufficiently "common" that they could not be said to embody the views of any
particular sect -- provided, at least, that the sect was Christian. When the apparent
purpose of a regulation was moral, state incursions that clearly would have be justified
otherwise -- such as the taking of property without compensation -- were approved and
even applauded.
Perhaps no legal intellectual symbolizes classical legal thought from Reconstruction
to the Gilded Age more than Thomas M. Cooley. His treatises on Constitution Limitations
(1868)96 and Taxation (1876),97 and his edition of Blackstone's CommentariesI (1871),98
are three of the Gilded Age’s most influential legal texts.
While Cooley's treatise on taxation argued that the sovereign could tax only for

94. See, e.g., FRANCIS WAYLAND, THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT COLLEGIATE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES 115 (1842) (arguing that the central goal of higher education is not learning but building of
character). See also HOWARD MILLER, THE REVOLUTIONARY COLLEGE: AMERICAN PRESBYTERIAN
HIGHER EDUCATION, 1707-1837 (1976); and MEYER, INSTRUCTED CONSCIENCE, note __.
95. For various contemporary definitions of the "police power" see Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S.
473, 480 (1905) (Brown, J.); COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, note __ at Ch. 16, esp. at
704-705. And see FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, note __ at §8, p. 6, defining the police power as
laws that are "not confined to the prohibition of wrongful acts," and justified by the proposition
"that every individual must submit to such restraints in the exercise of his liberty or of his rights of
property as may be required to remove or reduce the danger of the abuse of these rights on the part
of those who are unskillful, careless or unscrupulous."
96. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (1868).
97. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION, INCLUDING THE LAW OF LOCAL
ASSESSMENTS (1876; 2d ed. 1883).
98. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (T. M. Cooley, ed.
1871).
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"public purposes," which then must be narrowly defined,99 his Constitutional Limitations
first formalized the strictures on state regulatory power -- or the "police power" -- that we
have now come to identify with substantive due process. Cooley's genius was to describe
the state's police power as if it were broad, all the while interpreting it very narrowly. Under
Cooley's definition, the police power
embraces [the state's] whole system of internal regulation, by which the State seeks
not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offenses against the State, but
also to establish for the intercourse of citizens with citizens those rules of good
manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of
rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as is
reasonably consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others.100
Like the moral philosophers, Cooley distinguished state regulation of the economy
from state regulation of morals. While the former was most generally suspicious, at least if
property or contract rights were impaired, the latter was almost always appropriate. For
example, although the Constitution's contract clause prevented a state from impairing the
obligation of a pre-existing contract on economic grounds, it could do so on other grounds
where the good order of the community so required.101
Indeed, Cooley went so far as to approve of temperance statutes that closed down
distilleries that were legal when they were built, and without compensation to owners,
Cooley conceded:
Perhaps there is no instance in which the power of the legislature to make such
regulations as may destroy the value of property, without compensation to the
owner, appears in a more striking light than in the case of these statutes. The trade
in alcoholic drinks being lawful and the capital employed in it being fully protected
by law, the legislature then steps in, and by an enactment based on general
reasons of public utility, annihilates the traffic, destroys altogether the employment,
and reduces to a nominal value the property on hand. Even the keeping of that, for
the purposes of sale, becomes a criminal offence; and, without any change
whatever in his own conduct or employment, the merchant of yesterday becomes
the criminal of to-day, and the very building in which he lives and conducts the
business which to that moment was lawful becomes the subject of legal
proceedings, if the statute shall so declare, and liable to be proceeded against for a

99. See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, note __ at 38-39.
100. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, note __ at 704 (6th ed.).
101. Id. at 708.
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forfeiture.102
Such statutes were valid, Cooley believed, notwithstanding his more general position that
state protection of private property was a "sacred right" recognized by the Fourteenth
Amendment.103
Cooley's brief discussion approving Sunday closing laws offers a good insight into
his position on economic and moral regulation. On the one hand, Sunday closing laws
regulate the hours of labor, just as the ten hour law struck down in Lochner v. New
York,104 a decision that Cooley would undoubtedly have approved. On the other hand,
unlike the Lochner statute, Sunday closing laws are substantially motivated by religious
belief. Cooley noted that two sets of arguments had been offered for such laws. The first
was that Sunday closing benefits the individual alone in that "one day's rest in seven is
needful to recuperate the exhausted energies of body and mind."105 A second argument
was that such laws "require the proper deference and regard which those not accepting
the common belief may justly be required to pay to the public conscience."106 Cooley
found the second argument persuasive but not the first.107 People had liberty to contract
for their own hours of labor, and each individual could protect himself from excessive job
demands, including Sunday work. But recognition of a public conscience could be
achieved only by forcing deference, and this alone was sufficient to sustain Sunday closing
laws, just as it was sufficient to justify blasphemy statutes.
Ernst Freund expressed the same conclusions in more secular terms. Freund
noted that the "day of rest" argument "implies a recognition of the legislative power over
periods of work and of rest in general -- a power which many courts would perhaps be
unwilling to concede."108 However, Sunday closing laws were perfectly justifiable

102. Id. at 719-720.
103. Id. at 436.
104. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
105. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, note __ at 584.
106. Ibid.
107. However, Cooley also recognized that the argument involved a certain amount of
discrimination against those not holding Sunday sacred. For example, "...the Jew who is forced to
respect the first day of the week, when his conscience requires of him the observance of the seventh
also, may plausibly urge that the law discriminates against his religion...." Id. at 584.
108. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, note __ at 169.
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as an established social institution . . . for the protection of the good order and
comfort of the community established and recognized by common custom and
convention. As under natural conditions public order has a different meaning in the
night time and in the day time, so it has under social conventions a different
meaning on Sundays and weekdays.109
For Freund, however, this raised a problem respecting "business not soliciting public
patronage." If the machine shop makes no sales on Sunday but uses it workers to
assemble, it is hardly interfering with the peace of the community. In that case, forced
Sunday closure can be explained only as protection for workers who are competent to
protect themselves, and must be regarded as an "extreme measure."110
Christopher G. Tiedeman was second only to Cooley as an architect of Substantive
Due Process in the federal courts. Few legal scholars wrote more forcefully about the
need for self-determination and the vice of state interference in liberty of contract.111 But
where morals were concerned, self-determination quickly evaporated and gave way to
communitarian value and a broad concept of externalities.
Indeed, it is hard to believe that there was only one Tiedeman. He wrote in his
1886 Treatise on the Limitations of the Police Power in the United States:
A vice . . . consists in an inordinate, and hence immoral, gratification of one's
passions and desires. The primary damage is to one's self. When we contemplate
the nature of a vice, we are not conscious of a trespass upon the rights of others....
An intimate acquaintance with sociology reveals the universal interdependence of
individuals in the social state; no man liveth unto himself, and no man can be
addicted to vices, even of the most trivial character, without doing damage to the
material interests of society, and affecting each individual of the community to a
greater or less degree.112
Nevertheless, Tiedeman argued, "The object of police power is the prevention of crime,
109. Ibid.
110. Id. at 170.
111. CHRISTOPHER TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES (1886). On Tiedeman generally, see David N. Mayer, The Jurisprudence of Christopher G.
Tiedeman, 55 MIS. L. REV. 95 (1990).
112. TIEDEMAN, POLICE POWER, note __ at 149. See also CHRISTOPHER TIEDEMAN, THE
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1890).
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the protection of rights against the assaults of others.... It cannot be called into play in
order to save one from the evil consequences of his own vices, for the violation of a right
by the action of another must exist or be threatened, in order to justify the interference of
law."113 Although Tiedeman saw difficult philosophical problems in state regulation of
vices that caused no injury to others, he did not believe that these problems rose to
constitutional status. The legislature must have discretion to decide when a vice was
sufficiently harmful to warrant legal regulation.114
Conclusion:
Health, Safety, and Morals
Unlike the legal classicists, the Progressives who followed them were statists and
regulators. Imbued in the neoclassical economics of the day, they believed that state
intervention often made economic markets work better, and that forced redistribution of
wealth would increase total social welfare.115 By and large, they were also active
regulators of morals, often on grounds that were explicitly Christian.116 Indeed, one of the
reasons that Progressives had such increased enthusiasm about economic regulation is
that they began to see the distribution of wealth as a moral problem as well as an
economic one. Progressive economists such as Richard T. Ely and economistsociologists such as Edward Alsworth Ross painted vivid pictures of the wealthy as thieves
who were robbing society in a much more damaging fashion than the more explicit kind of
robber.117
But the Progressive Era Supreme Court continued to be dominated by Justices
who for reasons both ideological and political were firmly opposed to most of the
Progressive revolution. Nevertheless, even they would approve economic regulation if the
113. TIEDEMAN, POLICE POWER, note __ at 150.
114. Id. at 153.
115. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV.
993 (1990).
116. See, e.g., ROBERT M.CRUNDEN, MINISTERS OF REFORM: THE PROGRESSIVES' ACHIEVEMENT IN
AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, 1889-1920 (1982); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955).
117. See, e.g., EDWARD A. ROSS, SIN AND SOCIETY: AN ANALYSIS OF LATTER-DAY INIQUITY
(1907), esp. ch. 2, pp. 21-42 (1907), arguing that wealthy entrepreneurs and corporations should be
counted as more immoral than the common criminals who injure their victims one at a time. Cf.
James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908) (arguing that the common law
became increasingly ethical as society became more sophisticated); and RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS (John H. Wigmore & Albert Kocourek, eds. 1923).
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market at hand were found to be "affected with the public interest." This meant that the
Court had identified a qualifying "externality" -- or harmful effect on parties that were not
part of the underlying bargaining process. For example, in Lochner v. New York118 Justice
Peckham considered whether long hours for bakers might have an impact on the
"healthful quality of the bread" that they produced. Since bread consumers were not a
party to the bakers' wage and hour bargain, regulation might be needed to protect their
interests. But finding no such impact, Justice Peckham concluded that the full weight of
long working hours fell upon the parties to the labor bargain themselves, and these were
adults with constitutionally protected contractual capacity. By contrast, the Supreme Court
upheld comprehensive land use planning statutes -- clear and broad infringements of
liberty of contract -- because unregulated urban development had numerous harmful
effects on persons who could not be included in the bargaining process.119
Under a distinct but overlapping rationale, regulation was also permissible if it
pertained to the "health, safety, or morals" of the community. That triumvirate of terms
was used dozens of times by Supreme Court majority's to justify relatively substantial
encroachments on liberty of contract, or by dissenters to complain that a particular statute
should not have been condemned.120
118. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57, 62 (1905).
119. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391-394 (1926). On the substantive
due process Court's use of externalities to permit regulation, see HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, note __
at 199-205.
120. Among the numerous decisions in the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Treigle v. Acme Homestead
Assn., 297 U.S. 189, 194 (1936); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 304 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting, statute should have been upheld on public welfare grounds other than
health, safety, or morals); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (Butler, J., dissenting,
police power should be limited to statutes that appropriately regulate health, safety or morals);
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928) (requiring that regulation have a "substantial
relation to the public health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper
sense"); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 593 (1917) ("there is nothing in the nature of the
[regulated] business ... that in any way threatens or endangers the public health, safety, or morals.);
Rast v. Van Deman, 240 U.S. 342, 348 (1915); Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369, 372 (1915); Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 1, 16 (1915) (striking down statute forbidding employers from requiring employees
to sign promises that they would not join unions; finding no relationship between the act and the
"public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."); Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 349 (1900)
(upholding a statute restricting cigarette sales as bona fide regulation of health, safety or morals, or
the abatement of a public nuisance); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (concluding that
bakers' hours' statute could not be sustained "as a valid exercise of the police power to protect the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."). See also Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391
(1898) (reviewing older decisions); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (objecting that regulatory statute cannot constitute a taking under
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In Muller v Oregon,121 then attorney Louis Brandeis had the daunting task of
convincing the Supreme Court to approve a ten hour statute for women laundry
employees only three terms after it had struck down a similar provision for men in Lochner.
Brandeis and Josephine Goldmark accomplished this with their famous "Brandeis Brief" of
social science evidence justifying such regulation and available to the legislature at the
time it acted.122
First, Brandeis showed how women's position as mother and principal care taker of
children justified increased state solicitude. Since "like begets like," tired and physically
wasted mothers would burden society with the increased obligations and reduced benefits
of weak and mentally inferior offspring.123
But Brandeis also argued that the women's hour regulation really belonged in the
category of regulation of morals rather than mere economic regulation. The table of
contents of the Brandeis Brief went straight through the established litany, with separate
sections on the general "Bad Effect of Long Hours on Health," on Safety, and on
Morals.124 Then followed a separate section, with the same three divisions, on the
particular effect that employment in laundries had on health safety and morals.125 On
morals Goldmark and Brandeis wrote that "When the working day is so long that no time
whatever is left for a minimum of leisure or home-life, relief from the strain of work is
sought in alcoholic stimulants and other excesses." They then quoted from a
Massachusetts legislative report and a U.S. Senate Committee report to the effect that
long working hours led to alcohol abuse, which in turn led to unhealthy and undisciplined
children.126
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment if it is designed "to protect the public health, safety or morals
from dangers threatened").
121. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
122. Louis D. Brandeis, Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No.
107), reprinted in 16 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975). See also David P. Bryden,
Brandeis's Facts, 1 CONST. COMM. 281 (1984). Goldmark was a labor activist and Brandeis’ sisterin-law. She was very likely the actual author of the Brandeis Brief.
123. BRANDEIS BRIEF, note __ at 50-51.
124. Id. at 28-42, 42-44, 44-46.
125. Id. at 28 (health), 42 (safety), and 44 (morals).
126. Id. at 44.
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Brandeis' brief illustrates how different the Progressive view of economics and
morals was from the classical view. For the classicist, the world of economics and the
world of morals were sharply divided, one dealing with post-fallen mankind's own wishes,
and the other with obligations to the maker. By contrast, the Progressives secularized
both morals and economics and found the gap between the two to be both exaggerated
and bridgeable. Morality itself became identified with its economic consequences.
Further, and decisively for the Progressive, both markets and morals became essentially
communitarian rather than individualistic institutions, and the State appropriately had a
hand in both.

